Weekly QuEST Discussion Topics and News 23 Sept

September 22, 2016 Leave a comment

We want to continue our discussion on consciousness – to start the conversation I want to discuss the idea of Gists – for example see this story:

http://arstechnica.com/science/2016/09/doctors-dont-have-to-see-cancer-to-suspect-its-there/

Doctors don’t have to see cancer to suspect it’s there

Global processing lets radiologists pick up on cancerous tissue in a half-second.

Roheeni Saxena – 9/7/2016, 10:52 AM

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If you glance at your desk or bedroom, you’ll probably immediately know if something is out of place, even if you’re not able to put your finger on what exactly is wrong without a closer inspection. That’s because humans have the ability to rapidly get the gist of a situation using only a quick glance.

A recent study published in PNAS shows that this ability goes way beyond day-to-day practicalities. Radiologists who specialize in the detection of breast cancer can discriminate between normal and abnormal mammograms in as little as half a second. But they may not even need to look at the cancerous tissue to do so.

The authors of the paper were interested in a phenomenon known as global processing, in which a quick glance at a large image gives insight into its meaning. They gave radiologists just a moment to glance at breast tissue images and compared the results of the radiologists’ insights to carefully analyzed images.

Based on a half-second look at mammogram images, the radiologists were able to detect cancer at a rate greater than chance.This finding supports anecdotal stories from radiologists, who often report that an image will “appear bad” to them before they even identify the abnormality within the picture. In this scenario, it appears that the radiologists are reacting to an overall signal of cancer within the image, and this signal isn’t necessarily associated with the actual location of the cancer growth.

The real surprise, however, came when the researchers found that radiologists could identify an individual with cancer by showing them an image of the breast that is not affected by abnormal growth. (Again, this is just at a rate greater than chance.)

..

Once we hit the idea of Gists – it brings up the idea of how to act upon this ‘incomplete feeling’ about what to do – how can an agent act upon such a piece of information?  I could design a pattern recognition system that could use the Gists – but what if I designed an ‘artificially conscious’ system – or as nature has done a conscious system to use these calculations.

Using the approach from Cowell:

Minds, Machines and Qualia: A Theory of Consciousness
by
Christopher Williams Cowell
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy
in the
GRADUATE DIVISION of the
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

  • consciousness is the experiencing of qualia, a term I will define momentarily.
  • A system must continue to experience qualia if it is to remain conscious; any periods during which no qualia are experienced are periods in which the system has lost consciousness.
  • However, this slipping in and out of consciousness is not problematic. We do it every day when we fall into and out of dreamless (hence qualia-less) sleep.
  • There are many ways to use the terms \conscious” or \consciousness” that conform to this definition.

What do I mean by \qualia”? The term is thought to have originated with C. S. Peirce,1 but only fairly recently has it gained wide currency among philosophers of mind.  Charles Sanders Peirce. Collected Papers, vol. 6 of Scientific Metaphysics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1898, 1935. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds.

  • Discussions of qualia often begin with the claim, made in a weary and despairing tone, that it is impossible to describe what qualia are.  Any efforts at description or definition are then traditionally abandoned in favor of ostensive gestures toward individual qualia. Witness
  • two classic examples of this strategy, the first by Ned Block (using the term \phenomenal consciousness” essentially synonymously with \qualia”), and the second by David Chalmers

Chalmers:  I cannot define phenomenal consciousness in any remotely non-circular way. I don’t consider this an embarrassment. The history of reductive definitions in philosophy should lead one not to expect a reductive definition of anything. But the best one can do for phenomenal consciousness is in some respects worse than for many other things because really all one can do is point to the phenomenon. [9, p. 230]

  • What is central to consciousness, at least in the most interesting sense, is experience. But this is not a definition. At best, it is clarification.
  • Trying to define conscious experience in terms of more primitive notions is fruitless. One might as well try to define matter or space in terms of something more fundamental. The best we can do is give illustrations and characterizations that lie at the same level.  But I do not understand why it is considered so difficult to define the general nature of qualia. Providing a complete description of an individual quale (singular of \qualia”) seems well nigh impossible, I agree. But I just want to show what sort of things I’m talking about when I raise the topic of qualia, and that task doesn’t seem so onerous.
  • Unfortunately I can only define qualia using a series of phrases that will be excruciatingly familiar to anyone versed in contemporary philosophy of mind, but so be it.
  • A quale is the particular way it seems to a person to see something, taste something, or get sensory input from any of his three other sensory modalities. Qualia are the raw feels associated with experiences; they are what make different experiences seem or feel different from one another.

A quale is what it is like to undergo an experience. A quale is what gives an experience its subjective element. Qualia are thephenomenal contents of experiences. Or to borrow a sublimely simple illustration of the concept from Stubenberg, \the fact that there is something it is like to be you consists in the fact that you have qualia.”

All ‘conscious’ mental states involve qualia

  • Note that so far I have defined qualia purely in terms of sensory experience|all of the examples of qualia I have given are brought on by sense perception. However, I will eventually argue that all mental states that we would prephilosophically consider to be conscious (i.e., all of those states that are not deeply and permanently unconscious in some Freudian sense) involve qualia.
  • For instance, I claim (and will later demonstrate) that common, everyday thoughts such as \that chair is orange” or \it’s often windy in Boston” essentially involve qualia just as sense perception does. But for the sake of simplicity I now want to discuss only this thinner, perhaps less controversial notion of qualia.

Now let’s take the Cowell comments on Self:

  • Second, I will not tackle the topic of the self in any significant detail. Consciousness is often described as requiring a subject|sometimes called a \self” or \ego”|that bears conscious states.
  • While I agree that the notion of there being some entity which has or experiences conscious states is intuitively very appealing, there are a number of problems that arise with such a view.
  • To take just one example, it would seem to require that the self is independent of consciousness in some sense, and is capable of existing with no conscious states at all or perhaps even when disembodied.

This raises all sorts of questions and worries about the exact ontological status of such a self, which often lead in turn to vague and unsatisfying claims about the self being \spiritual” or \soul-like.”

The QuEST position on Self was a real turning point – it is the quale evoked when the stimulus is the agent generating the qualia – it is no more mysterious than the red you consciously experience

While I do think that a full understanding of consciousness will ultimately require some resolution to the question of whether a self is required for consciousness to take root in, and if so, what sort of thing that self might be, those are not questions that my project demands answers to.

  • I think I can make helpful observations about what consciousness is without necessarily taking a stand on the relation between consciousness and a putative self.

And if we “can make helpful observations about what consciousness is” – what are the implications of those observations to the current technology trends like virtual reality:

We’ve previously discussed the ‘body-swap’ illusion – illusion that either a mannequin or another person’s body is their own – a concern/idea to be exploited as we make great strides in virtual reality!  A real understanding of the nature of self may be key.  The key to the illusion is receipt of simultaneous and synchronized visual and motor input (recall the feather stroking and hammer example …

One study analyzes the rubber-hand illusion, an old parlor trick. A subject sees a rubber hand plausibly positioned to extend from her arm while her real hand is hidden. If the fake and real hands are stroked simultaneously, she may feel the stroking in the location of the rubber hand, not the real one. Henrik Ehrsson of University College London and colleagues performed the trick on a group of subjects and scanned their brains This finding suggests that the activity in these areas reflects the detection of congruent multisensory signals from one’s own body, rather than of visual representations. We propose that this could be the mechanism for the feeling of body ownership.

If you let them touch and rub the rubber hand and you stroke the real hand in unison it locks in the self quale.

This shows how cross sensory prediction plays a role in our perception you feel what you predict – the attribute of the location of the stimuli is trumped by the prediction of where you expect to feel it

Then Dr. Ehrsson grabbed a hammer. While people were experiencing the illusion, he pretended to smash the virtual body by waving the hammer just below the cameras. Immediately, the subjects registered a threat response as measured by sensors on their skin. They sweated, and their pulses raced. They also reacted emotionally, as if they were watching themselves get hurt.

I recall this video also where a dog chewing on a bone started snarling and then snapping at its back paw – my assumption was the dog had lost the sense of self associated with that appendage – thus it calculated another critter was coming for hits bone.

The world model (qualia) also has a unity about it in that everything is from the one perspective of the qualia system generating the world model.   All Gists that are generated are taken from the qualiarization system’s sensors that are unique to that system and to that system’s embedding.  That world model is embodied within a system that is equipped with sensors to observe the world and it is embedded within the world it is modeling.

  • The world model (qualia) are a useful and consistent representation of the world from the perspective of the qualiarization system (example – visual aspects of the representation are as ‘seen’ from the qualiarization system angle of its visual sensors)

Draw a letter on the palm facing away from you, then make the same drawing on the palm facing towards you – note the same sensory input is perceived differently based on perspective.  RECENT BODY SWAP ILLUSIONS based here!

The body associated with your mind can be swapped so you perceive the

mannequin as your body – this shows the power of UNITY in qualia – even the

rubber hand idea – all make your world model accept the inplausible narrative

that something is part of you when it clearly isn’t

Your body is mine

A new experiment indicates that, under the right circumstances, people feel like they have swapped bodies with someone else

By Bruce Bower

December 6th, 2008; Vol.174 #12 (p. 16)

In the mannequin situation, an experimenter simultaneously touched the participant’s belly and the mannequin’s belly with separate probes. So the volunteer felt a poking in the abdomen but saw the poking happen as if he or she were the mannequin. In the real-person situation, participant and experimenter shook hands. Thus, while volunteers felt the sensation of hand shaking, it appeared to them that they were shaking their own hand. After 10 to 12 seconds of abdominal touch or hand-shaking, male and female participants spontaneously had the experience of looking out from the body of the male mannequin or the female experimenter. They literally felt that they were in the mannequin’s body getting poked or had embodied the female experimenter and were shaking their own hands.

“In the body-swap illusion, we can see that multisensory information powerfully affects the brain,” says neuroscientist Patrick Haggard of University College London, who was not part of the research team.

Petkova and Ehrsson first confirmed that 16 male and 16 female volunteers experienced an illusory body-swap with a mannequin. After undergoing the procedure, participants indicated on a questionnaire that they had experienced the mannequin’s body as their own. They didn’t feel that they had become plastic like a mannequin, Petkova notes. Volunteers reported having had an expectation that, if they moved, the mannequin’s body would move accordingly.

I recall writing  in the tenets a discussion about how we represent definitions of anything – for example in Second Look we never could capture in numbers an adequate definition of breast cancer – defining cancer in terms of feature definitions (size, opacity, texture, …) is very unappealing in the sense of the resulting requirement for gathering enough data to completely distinguish any cancer for any non-cancer in any woman – we need a better representation or the perfect set of features or infinite data – all are impossible unless the problem is trivial which breast cancer is not

 

In response to matt’s question yesterday – how are we ever going to do ‘self’ – my response wasn’t a good one – again the answer has to be in terms of whatever representation we are using – so if we are using Adam’s dynamic link sets to represent then it is our task to come up with the characteristics that an embodiment of self in that representation must have.  So for example one of the characteristics of ‘self’ was continuity – the concept of a narrative – the idea that there must be some means in your representation of self to capture past, present, and future.  (by the way in our view time is a quale and thus its representation must also have defining characteristics like the qualia theory of relativity).

 

Will a representation of self that captures sensory data and does so in a form that maintains relationships between  past, present and future expectation of data achieve self –

 

of course not –

 

But

 

Sense we are defining self as not a thing – it is a quale which as all qualia is evoked by a set of other qualia (we wrote it is a process that involves a set of processes) – when our representation (like the link set one) evokes enough of these constituent processes we hope to get an engineering advantage.   So our task is to come up with a defining set of processes (qualia) that will achieve a useful implementation of qualia like ‘self’.

 

No ant ‘knows’ it is part of the colony (no neuron knows it is part of a sentient being) – but the colony computes self (as does a colony of neurons)– the assumption in what is below is that there is a genetic sensing ability of the members of the colony – our task is to be able to have a process (a kernel) that explores and forms a world model (what is in the environment) and as part of that world model also inserts what makes up ‘self’ as distinct to what is the rest of the world – this computation is critical to ant survival – and if we are right is the key computation that will allow vehicle health assessment and cyber health assessment and in fact the key breakthrough in medical processing.

Genetic Differences Lead to Ant Warfare

Friday , December 01, 2006

By Sara Goudarzi

When it comes to differentiating a friend from a rival, invasive ants have it easier than humans: They can spot genetic differences, a new study shows.

Invasive Argentine ants form large supercolonies in California. These colonies stretch for hundreds of miles and include millions of nests.

Ants from different nests of the same colony rarely show aggression toward each other. But those of different supercolonies clash often and engage in battles that result in the death of many workers.

The largest supercolony in southern California extends some 600 miles and borders three smaller colonies.

The researchers collected dead workers at the territory borders of one of the smaller colonies at Lake Hodges each week for six months. Battles in that area killed at least 15 million worker ants.

But when they placed ants from a distant location of the same colony next to each other, they didn’t fight.

The ants from the same supercolony were genetically similar no matter what their geographical distance was from each other. But they were genetically different than those in the neighboring supercolonies, the researchers note.

“Our results are strong evidence that lack of genetic diversity permits supercolonies to arise,” said study co-author Melissa Thomas, now a researcher from at the University of Western Australia. “Workers cannot differentiate between nestmates and non-nestmates if they all seem the same. So ants from different nests in the same colony do not fight with each other.”

According to the researchers, keeping peace with their kin allows the ants to devote more resources to breeding.

“Territory defense is expensive both in time and workers,” Thomas said. “If nests invest this time and workforce into collecting resources and raising larvae instead of defending territories, then colonies should grow at a much faster rate.”

The study is detailed in the December issue of the journal Molecular Ecology.

Copyright © 2006 Imaginova Corp. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed

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Weekly QuEST Discussion Topics and News, 16 Sept

September 15, 2016 Leave a comment

QuEST 16 Sept 2016

Couple of topics this week – there was the recent series of news articles on dogs understanding and dolphin language – and then continue our discussions on frequently asked questions

With Dogs, It’s What You Say — and How You Say It 

By JAMES GORMAN AUG. 29, 2016

Dogs that were trained to enter an M.R.I. machine for the research

Who’s a good dog?

Well, that depends on whom you’re asking, of course. But new research suggests that the next time you look at your pup, whether Maltese or mastiff, you might want to choose your words carefully.

“Both what we say and how we say it matters to dogs,” said Attila Andics, a research fellow at Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest.

Dr. Andics, who studies language and behavior in dogs and humans, along with Adam Miklosi and several other colleagues, reported in a paper to be published in this week’s issue of the journal Science that different parts of dogs’ brains respond to the meaning of a word, and to how the word is said, much as human brains do.

A dog waiting for its brain activity to be measured in a magnetic resonance imaging machine for research reported in the journal Science. As with people’s brains, parts of dogs’ left hemisphere react to meaning and parts of the right hemisphere to intonation — the emotional content of a sound. And, perhaps most interesting to dog owners, only a word of praise said in a positive tone really made the reward system of a dog’s brain light up. The experiment itself was something of an achievement. Dr. Andics and his colleagues trained dogs to enter a magnetic resonance imaging machine and lie in a harness while the machine recorded their brain activity. A trainer spoke words in Hungarian — common words of praise used by dog owners like “good boy,” “super” and “well done.” The trainer also tried neutral words like “however” and “nevertheless.” Both the praise word

And some related technical pubs:

Current Biology 24, 574–578, March 3, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.01.058

Farago´ T, Andics A, Devecseri

V, Kis A, Ga´csi M, Miklo´si A. 2014 Humans rely on the same rules to assess emotional valence and intensity in conspecific and dog vocalizations.

Biol. Lett. 10: 20130926.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2013.0926

Dolphin article

The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2016/09/11/dolphins-recorded-having-a-conversation-for-first-time/

Dolphins recorded having a conversation ‘just like two people’ for first time

Definitions The continuation of the Frequently Asked Questions discussion:

Anytime we’ve engaged a new colleague on the topics that concern us in QuEST we have to go through a ‘break-in’ period where we converge on the meaning of words, or at least how we use those words in the QuEST discussions.  Recently in our interactions with the community on topics of Autonomy, Artificial Intelligence and Human-Machine teaming/Collaboration we’ve encountered this same barrier.  This week we want to discuss a Frequently Asked Questions approach to lowering that barrier.  So if you’ve ever been asked or wondered ‘What is Intelligence?’ or ‘What is Autonomy?’ or ‘What is artificial intelligence?’ or ‘What is reasoning?’ or ‘What is consciousness?’ or ‘Do machines understand me?’  ‘What is understanding?’ or ‘What is cognition?’ or thus ‘What is cognitive Electronic Warfare?’ …, we encourage you to engage with us this week as we provide a forum to generate a ‘self-consistent’ set of answers to these and many more FAQs and will take any questions from the group that we also need to add to the FAQ.

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Weekly QuEST Discussion Topics, 9 Sept

September 8, 2016 Leave a comment

This week we will continue our discussion led by our colleague Teresa H.:

Can we reverse engineer an epiphenomenon?

Cognitive events (representations, emotions, thoughts, meaning-making) can be thought of as re-entrant feedback loops between sensory and association areas in the brain, all of which are operationalized by firing of individual neurons living in groups. The discipline of neurophenomenology (Francisco J. Varela, founder) posits each cell is a living entity having a unique experience of its life in our heads. Consider that each cell in our nervous system has paracrine (talking to other cells) and autocrine (the cell talks to itself) functions. So all of these little creatures are living in our heads behaving as individuals and as members of discrete groups, and this behavior somehow gets bound into the illusion of a discrete thought or set of qualia that signal we are eating mom’s apple pie or are presently stuck in traffic, etc.  Is mind an epiphenomenon of all this activity? Would one predict the raucous behavior of billions of cells living in our heads would result in our experience of mind? Can neurophysiological processes underlying experience of mind be engineered into a machine and its programming? What neurophysiological processes might be sufficient and necessary to accomplish this goal?

The second topic is a Frequently Asked Questions discussion:

Anytime we’ve engaged a new colleague on the topics that concern us in QuEST we have to go through a ‘break-in’ period where we converge on the meaning of words, or at least how we use those words in the QuEST discussions.  Recently in our interactions with the community on topics of Autonomy, Artificial Intelligence and Human-Machine teaming/Collaboration we’ve encountered this same barrier.  This week we want to discuss a Frequently Asked Questions approach to lowering that barrier.  So if you’ve ever been asked or wondered ‘What is Intelligence?’ or ‘What is Autonomy?’ or ‘What is artificial intelligence?’ or ‘What is reasoning?’ or ‘What is consciousness?’ or ‘Do machines understand me?’  ‘What is understanding?’ or ‘What is cognition?’ or thus ‘What is cognitive Electronic Warfare?’ …, we encourage you to engage with us this week as we provide a forum to generate a ‘self-consistent’ set of answers to these and many more FAQs and will take any questions from the group that we also need to add to the FAQ.

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Weekly QuEST Discussion Topics 2 Sept

September 1, 2016 Leave a comment

QuEST 2 Sept 2016

This week we will have a presentation by our colleague Teresa H.:

Can we reverse engineer an epiphenomenon?

Cognitive events (representations, emotions, thoughts, meaning-making) can be thought of as re-entrant feedback loops between sensory and association areas in the brain, all of which are operationalized by firing of individual neurons living in groups. The discipline of neurophenomenology (Francisco J. Varela, founder) posits each cell is a living entity having a unique experience of its life in our heads. Consider that each cell in our nervous system has paracrine (talking to other cells) and autocrine (the cell talks to itself) functions. So all of these little creatures are living in our heads behaving as individuals and as members of discrete groups, and this behavior somehow gets bound into the illusion of a discrete thought or set of qualia that signal we are eating mom’s apple pie or are presently stuck in traffic, etc.  Is mind an epiphenomenon of all this activity? Would one predict the raucous behavior of billions of cells living in our heads would result in our experience of mind? Can neurophysiological processes underlying experience of mind be engineered into a machine and its programming? What neurophysiological processes might be sufficient and necessary to accomplish this goal?

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No QuEST Meeting this week, 26 Aug

August 25, 2016 Leave a comment

Due to Capt Amerika’s travel schedule, there will be no meeting this week.  We will plan on resuming our schedule next week.  Hope everyone has a safe and fun weekend.

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Weekly QuEST Discussion Topics and News, 19 Aug

August 19, 2016 Leave a comment

We want to start this week with an example of ‘reward hacking’ in nature.  While watching a YouTube Ted talk at the link (provided by sean a quest colleague) below from Don Hoffmann

https://www.ted.com/playlists/384/how_your_brain_constructs_real

Below are my notes on the video:

What is the relationship between your conscious experience and reality – just like Alladin appearing from the bottle the magic appearance of consciousness is just as mysterious – brain activity are correlated with conscious experience but not know why – we still don’t know – we lack the necessary constructs to explain –

Made false assumption – that assumption is do we see reality as it is? Open eyes and have experience a red tomato a meter away – I believe there is a red tomato a meter away – I close my eyes I think there still is a red tomato a meter away – so logic seems to dictate that our conscious experience is reality BUT

Used to think world was flat – senses seem to imply – we found false – similar thought earth  was center of universe – we were wrong – taste, odors, colors are in the mind of the agents not in  the world –

Neuro sci say a third of cortex used for vision – think vision is a camera – an objective reality – there is part that is like a camera – the eye – 130million photo receptors in the eye – but the billions of neurons and trillions of synapses involved in vision – we construct what we see – we don’t construct the whole world only what we need in the moment – example is visual illusions – we construct a 3 d cube Necker cube – we create motion when flipping colors of dots on a page

Neuro scientist think we reconstruct reality – accurate reconstruction of real red tomato that really exists – why would we reconstruct reality – those that do right better likely to have offspring with more reality … – vision useful because it is so accurate is in common text –

Accurate perceptions are better  – implications –

Now the example that I want to talk about:

This is the Jewell Beetle – it’s purpose in life is to find other Jewell beetles and mate – but then there are human men – their main purpose in life is to drink beer – and throw the bottles into the outback – bottles in outback caused beetles to attempt to mate – had to change bottles – evolution had told beetle that big bumpy glossy things have sex with – the beetle was going extinct– the male couldn’t make this mistake – even moose make the mistake – does natural selection really favor reality as it is – there is reward hacking —- ***** beetle is great example – they were going extinct –

Jewell beetle

 

Jewell beetle attempting to mate with a beer bottle

The fitness function being used did for millennia accomplish having the beetles reproduce – but then something changed – beer bottles – all autonomous systems look to solve an objective function as efficiently as possible – BUT –

Steak – fitness of animal – for a well fed lion – not the same thing as reality as it is – fitness is the key part of the evolution equation –

Modeling and sim – some see part of reality – who wins – perception of reality goes extinct – organizations that tuned to fitness not reality – perception does NOT favor accurate perception of reality –

How can not seeing the world accurately be better off – we don’t see reality as it is – we are shaped by tricks / hacks / reward hacking that keeps us alive

Metaphor – desktop – of computer – icon of ted talk – is the text file blue rectangular an in corner of screen – the purpose of the interface is not to show reality of the computer – it is there to hide reality – it is to be useful – evolution has given us an interface that hides reality and consciousness is icons on the desktop – train coming down the track – so step in front of it Prof Hoffman – this is the structural coherence tenet

Evolution has shaped us with perceptual signals that keep us alive – they keep us safe – doesn’t mean we should take them literally – metal of train mostly space – physics has taught – know reality of computer – see pixels of computer with magnifying glass – we all see the train – so none of us construct the train – the necker cube see we construct – we all see the cube cause we all construct the cube – all physical objects we construct perception – perception is not a window on reality  – reality is like a 3d desktop that hides complexity of reality – we believe space time and objects are the nature of reality as it is

There is something that exists where we look – but it isn’t what we are perceiving –

We have advantage over the jewell beetle –

Donald Hoffman –

Interacting with reality is not reality – lions perceived is not what a lion is –

Reality whatever it is – brains and neurons – species specific sets of symbols –

Consciousness – perhaps reality is a machine – vast interactive agents

Give up false assumption on perception of reality –

Given this set up let’s return to our investigation of hypnosis – since the ideas being acted upon by the person that is hypnotized are not reality – how does this occur? –

  • seems to me this is the ideal case of hypnosis, you have an agent that you have become almost hyper-aligned with and thus when they introduce context into your representation you take it for granted, no filtering it out regardless of how badly it might fit with your current representation.  still looks to me like this is an explanation for hypnosis impacting the sys2 representation?
  • i would argue that a basic agent with no two system representation CANNOT be hypnotized. Way to demonstrate animals are consciousness!  they cannot experience a disconnect between something they know to be real and something that they think SHOULD be real.

for the purposes of this discussion assume that in the hypnotic state(and that such a state really exists) you are using qualia not unlike sleepwalking, the hypnotist can insert into your dream state suggestions that manipulate your ‘dream’ – so there is still a sys1 set of calculations that go on below the level of the sys2 qualia and the qualia of sys2 are those aspects of the hypnotic state that in that state you use qualia for you are ‘conscious’ of ***

 

specifically what I am interested in for this discussion is optimizing performance under stress for an agent:

 

Psychophysiology, 49 (2012), 1417–1425. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Printed in the USA.

Copyright © 2012 Society for Psychophysiological Research

DOI: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2012.01449.x

 

The effect of challenge and threat states on performance:

An examination of potential mechanisms

 

LEE J. MOORE, SAMUEL J. VINE, MARK R. WILSON, and PAUL FREEMAN

College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK

 

Abstract

Challenge and threat states predict future performance; however, no research has examined their immediate effect on motor task performance. The present study examined the effect of challenge and threat states on golf putting performance

and several possible mechanisms. One hundred twenty-seven participants were assigned to a challenge or threat group and performed six putts during which emotions, gaze, putting kinematics, muscle activity, and performance were

recorded. Challenge and threat states were successively manipulated via task instructions. The challenge group performed more accurately, reported more favorable emotions, and displayed more effective gaze, putting kinematics, and

muscle activity than the threat group. Multiple putting kinematic variables mediated the relationship between group and performance, suggesting that challenge and threat states impact performance at a predominately kinematic level.

 

In my mind I want to tie this to the issues emotional intelligence – and back to our discussion on what is intelligence – and how do qualia contribute to intelligence – and given that position how can we give the skills to our agents to facilitate acceptable responses by improving their emotional intelligence

 

  • Emotional intelligence (EI) or emotional quotient (EQ) is the capacity of individuals to recognize their own, and other people’s emotions, to discriminate between different feelings and label them appropriately, and to use emotional information to guide thinking and behavior
  • I’ve struggled with the ‘label’ part of the definition – I’ve always felt that it is the experience not the word – see our computing with words discussion – the intelligence is a function of the discretization of the experience space not being able to articulate labels – only that you can experience the distinct range

So the question is how do we provide an improvement of the qualia discretization over the stimuli space to improve the intelligence of a human or computer agent – approve the agents ability to acceptably respond to a wider range of stimuli

 

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Weekly QuEST Discussion Topics and News, 12 Aug

August 11, 2016 Leave a comment

QuEST 12 Aug 2016

We have several topics that have captured my attention this week.  The first is to recast the use of AI to solve really Big Problems – making the world a better place.  How to adapt the approaches to complex and abstract problems like the ones we’ve discussed with our colleague on inner city violence / drugs.

http://www.technologyreview.com/news/545416/could-ai-solve-the-worlds-biggest-problems/

Could AI Solve the World’s Biggest Problems?

Advances in machine-learning techniques have opened up a wealth of promising opportunities for AI applications, but some tech executives are thinking about ways it can make the world a better place.

Demis Hassabis, CEO of Google Deepmind, a division within Google doing groundbreaking work in machine learning, and which aims to bring about an “artificial general intelligence” (see “Google’s Intelligence Designer”), said the goal of this effort was to harness AI for grand challenges. “If we can solve intelligence in a general enough way, then we can apply it to all sorts of things to make the world a better place,” he said.

And the chief technology officer of Facebook, Mike Schroepfer, expressed similar hope. “The power of AI technology is it can solve problems that scale to the whole planet,” he said.

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601139/how-google-deepmind-plans-to-solve-intelligence/

How Google DeepMind Plans to Solve Intelligence

Mastering Go is just the beginning for Google DeepMind, which hopes to create human-like artificial intelligence.

Sponsored by

Padded walls, gloomy lighting, and a ceiling with floral wallpaper. It doesn’t look like a place to make groundbreaking discoveries that change the trajectory of society. But in these simulated, claustrophobic corridors, Demis Hassabis thinks he can lay the foundations for software that’s smart enough to solve humanity’s biggest problems.

Another example problem that fits into this pocket in my mind is how to take on the issue of ISIS online either controlling or inspiring terrorist activity.

from http://science.sciencemag.org/ on June 20, 2016

 

New online ecology of adversarial

aggregates: ISIS and beyond

  1. F. Johnson,1 M. Zheng,1 Y. Vorobyeva,2 A. Gabriel,1 H. Qi,1 N. Velasquez,2
  2. Manrique,1 D. Johnson,3 E. Restrepo,4 C. Song,1 S. Wuchty5,6*

 

Support for an extremist entity such as Islamic State (ISIS) somehow manages to survive globally online despite considerable external pressure and may ultimately inspire acts by individuals having no history of extremism, membership in a terrorist faction, or direct links

to leadership. Examining longitudinal records of online activity, we uncovered an ecology evolving on a daily time scale that drives online support, and we provide a mathematical theory that describes it. The ecology features self-organized aggregates (ad hoc groups formed via linkage to a Facebook page or analog) that proliferate preceding the onset of recent real-world campaigns and adopt novel adaptive mechanisms to enhance their survival. One of the predictions is that development of large, potentially potent pro-ISIS aggregates can be thwarted by targeting smaller ones.

 

 

The next topic is associated with group intelligence.

 

http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/01/the-secret-to-smart-groups-isnt-smart-people/384625/

The Secret to Smart Groups: It’s women

A fleet of MIT studies finds that women are much better at knowing what their colleagues are really thinking. It’s another reason to expect the gender wage gap to eventually flip.

The concept of “general intelligence”—the idea that people who are good at one mental task tend to be good at many others—was considered radical in 1904, when Charles Spearman proposed the theory of a “g factor.” Today, however, it is among the most replicated findings in psychology. But whereas in 1904 the U.S. economy was a network of farms, mills, and artisans, today’s economy is an office-based affair, where the most important g for many companies doesn’t stand for general intelligence, but, rather, groups.

So, what makes groups smart? Is there any such thing as a “smart” group, or are groups just, well, clumps of smart people?

Downloaded from www.sciencemag.org on October 31, 2010

 

Evidence for a Collective Intelligence

Factor in the Performance of

Human Groups

Anita Williams Woolley,1* Christopher F. Chabris,2,3 Alex Pentland,3,4

Nada Hashmi,3,5 Thomas W. Malone3,5

 

Psychologists have repeatedly shown that a single statistical factor—often called “general intelligence”—emerges from the correlations among people’s performance on awide variety of cognitive tasks. But no one has systematically examined whether a similar kind of “collective intelligence” exists for groups of people. In two studies with 699 people, working in groups of two to five, we find converging evidence of a general collective intelligence factor that explains a group’s performance on a wide variety

of tasks. This “c factor” is not strongly correlated with the average or maximum individual intelligence of group members but is correlated with the average social sensitivity of group members, the equality in distribution of conversational turn-taking, and the proportion of females in the group.

 

 

This leads to a related article (at least in my mind) – on the effect of challenge and threat states on performance …

 

Psychophysiology, 49 (2012), 1417–1425. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Printed in the USA.

Copyright © 2012 Society for Psychophysiological Research

DOI: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2012.01449.x

 

The effect of challenge and threat states on performance:

An examination of potential mechanisms

 

LEE J. MOORE, SAMUEL J. VINE, MARK R. WILSON, and PAUL FREEMAN

College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK

 

Abstract

Challenge and threat states predict future performance; however, no research has examined their immediate effect on motor task performance. The present study examined the effect of challenge and threat states on golf putting performance

and several possible mechanisms. One hundred twenty-seven participants were assigned to a challenge or threat group and performed six putts during which emotions, gaze, putting kinematics, muscle activity, and performance were

recorded. Challenge and threat states were successively manipulated via task instructions. The challenge group performed more accurately, reported more favorable emotions, and displayed more effective gaze, putting kinematics, and

muscle activity than the threat group. Multiple putting kinematic variables mediated the relationship between group and performance, suggesting that challenge and threat states impact performance at a predominately kinematic level.

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